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RECENT DECISIONS
CONFLICT OF LAWS - BABCOCK DOCTRINE - TORT ACTION
BETWEEN NEW YORK Domc LIARIEs RESULTS IN APPLICATION OF
COLORADO GUEST STATUTE.- Plaintiff, a passenger in defendant's
automobile, sustained personal injuries as a consequence of a colli-
sion with another vehicle in Colorado. Both plaintiff and defendant
were New York domiciliaries, and defendant's automobile was regis-
tered and insured in New York. The host-guest relationship, how-
ever, had originated and was to terminate in Colorado, where the
parties had taken up temporary residence. Relying on the conflict of
laws rule enunciated in Babcock v. Jackson,: the New York Court
of Appeals held that since Colorado had the most significant contacts
with the matter in controversy and a dominant interest in the out-
come of the litigation, its guest statute, which would prevent plain-
tiff's recovery, was applicable. Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209
N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
Three predominant theories have evolved in explanation of the
various rules operating in the area of conflict of laws; they may be
classified as the comity, local law and the vested rights theories.2
An early advocate of the comity approach was Justice Story, who
insisted that a foreign law never applied of its own force, but was
permitted by the forum as a means of achieving justice.3 Similarly,
the local law theory asserts that the forum creates rights and obli-
gations by applying its own laws in a manner consistent with those
of the foreign state.4 A more legalistic position is espoused by the
supporters of the vested rights doctrine, who do not indulge in the
view that the choice of law is dependent upon the option of a court
to choose or create as it wishes or as justice demands; they maintain
that a set of legal rights and obligations is created at the time of the
act and is then applicable in any forum in which the action may be
commenced. Thus, it is not the law of the foreign jurisdiction which
is enforced, but rather a transitory legal right.5
Traditionally, in the tort area, the rule applied in New York
has been that of lex loci delictus, an expression of the vested rights
1 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2 GOODRicH & SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 6 (4th ed. 1964).
3 Id. at 6, 8. See also Cheatham, American Theories of Conflict of
Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARv. L. REv. 361, 363-70 (1945).
4 GOoDRicH & SCoLES, op. cit. supra note 2.
5 3 BEAIF, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1967-69 (1935); Cheatham, supra note 3,
at 379-85. The enforcement of these rights is limited to the remedies available
under the law of the forum. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597
(1936).
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concept.6 Under this doctrine, the law to be applied is the law of the
jurisdiction wherein the injury occurred,7 and the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties are established at the place of the accident and
enforceable everywhere. The merits of the lex loci delictus rule are
numerous. The controlling law is relatively easy to ascertain and
is applicable to all parties to a litigation; the attractiveness of "forum
shopping" is reduced, since the result is not dependent upon the
jurisdiction in which the action is commenced; and the outcome of
a particular controversy is reasonably predictable, thereby facilitating
settlements.8 However, the major feature of lex loci delictus, i.e.,
the simplicity of its application, may also be its major defect. The
law of the place of the tort is invariably applied and, as such, the
principle ignores the social and policy considerations of the states
involved, and the value of a just result.9
Despite general adherence to lex loci, the principle, historically,
was not applied in New York when it would violate the established
public policy of the state. Noteworthy in this respect is the case of
Mertz v. Mertz,10 wherein the Court of Appeals dismissed a negli-
gence suit brought by a wife against her husband, both New York
domiciliaries, for personal injuries which were sustained in Con-
necticut. Recognizing that there would have been a valid cause
of action in Connecticut, where, unlike New York, the common-law
disability between husband and wife had been abolished, the Court
held that the claim was not actionable in New York since it was
violative of the "deep-rooted tradition" of the state.
In a wrongful death action, Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,"
the Court, although employing a distinction between procedural and
substantive law, apparently rested its decision upon public policy
considerations. Decedent, a New York domiciliary, purchased an
airplane ticket in New York and departed on a plane leaving from
a New York airport. The plane crashed in Massachusetts.
Defendant sought to limit the recovery in accordance with a pro-
vision of the Massachusetts wrongful death statute.12  The New
York Court of Appeals rejected the monetary limitation of the
Massachusetts statute, reasoning that it pertained to the remedy
rather than the right; since the policy of the forum controls on
6 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281, 240 N.Y.S.
2d 743, 746 (1963). See Comments On Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent De-
velopment In Conflict Of Laws, 63 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1212, 1229 (1963)(Cheatham's view).
7 Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 298 N.Y. 62, 80 N.E.2d 334 (1948) ; RESTATE-
mENT, CoNF. CT OF LAWS § 378 (1934).8 Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confs.sion In New York, 1963 DuxE L.J.
1, 10-11.9 Babcock v. Jackson, .supra note 6.20 Supra note 5.
119 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S2d 133 (1961).
22 MAss. AwN. LAWS ch. 229, § 2 (1955), as amended.
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matters of procedure, New York would not deviate from its policy
of unlimited recovery.' 3
A significant innovation in New York's policy was made in the
contract case of Auten v. Auten."4  There, the Court did not adhere
to the traditional conflicts rules governing the interpretation and
enforcement of a contract; 1' rather, it applied a "grouping of
contacts" theory. The rule, as the Court noted, afforded less
certainty and predictability than under the previous rules. How-
ever, "grouping of contacts" was considered preferable, since it applied
the policy of the place "having the most interest in the problem"
and having a predominant concern with the outcome of the specific
litigation.' 6 The case involved a separation agreement, made in
New York, by English citizens. There were no "contacts" with
New York other than the agreement. Defendant-husband was in
the United States on a temporary visa; plaintiff-wife was present
in New York solely to secure the agreement and immediately
thereafter returned to England, as had been contemplated by the
agreement. The Court, weighing the contacts, held that the law
of England was to be applied.
Although Auten was decided prior to Kilberg, its rationale
was not followed therein. Judge Fuld, concurring in Kilberg, noted
that the "grouping of contacts" approach was foreclosed, since the
New York wrongful death statute was available only when a
tort was committed in New York. Since the tort had been com-
mitted in Massachusetts, the cause of action could be based only
on that state's statute.17
The "grouping of contacts" theory was not extended into the
tort area until the 1963 decision in Babcock v. Jackson,8 which was
factually ideal as an illustration of the harsh consequences resulting
under lex loci. The parties, New York domiciliaries, embarked from
New York on a weekend excursion to Ontario, Canada, and, as
a result of an accident caused by defendant-driver's negligence,
plaintiff-passenger suffered personal injuries. Defendant, relying
on the lex loci rule, set up Ontario's "guest" statute as a defense.
13 But see Davenport v. Webb, 11 N.Y.2d 392, 183 N.E2d 902, 230 N.Y.S.2d
17 (1962)..
1 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.F-2d 99 (1954).15 "All matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and the validity
of contiacts . . . are determined by the law 'of the place where the contract
is made, while all matters connected with its performance . . . are
regulated by the law of the place where the contract, by its terms, is to be
performed.' $ Id. at 160, 124 N.E.2d at 101 (quoting the essential text of
Union Nat'l Bank v. Chapman, 169' N.Y. 538; 543, 62 N.E. 672, 673
(1902)).
'L6 Id. at 161, 124 N.E.2d at 102.
17 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, In, 9 N.Yf2d 34, 45, 172 N.E.2d
526, 531, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 140 (1961) (concurring opinion).
18 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963).
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The Court, in an opinion written by Judge Fuld, held that the
place of the tort did not invariably govern the availability of relief
and, in resolving the choice of law problem, applied the "grouping
of contacts" test . It was, however, carefully pointed out that the
standard of conduct to be applied in determining whether defendant
had been negligent was that indicated by the law of Ontario.1 9
New York's "contacts" were undoubtedly numerically superior.
The injuries were suffered by plaintiff as a result of defendant's
negligent operation of an automobile garaged, licensed and insured
in New York. Furthermore, the journey began and was to end
in New York. Yet, none of these factors was held conclusive;
the policy served by the enforcement or denial of the remedy was
also to be considered. 20  The test, therefore, was qualitative, rather
than quantitative. The Court found that the concern of New
York was greater and more direct than that of Ontario, the latter
being characterized as merely the fortuitous site of the accident.
In refusing to apply the Ontario "guest" statute, the Court explicitly
referred to its standards as "justice, fairness and the 'the best practical
result . . . . , ,21
Several recent cases have involved the concepts discussed in
Babcock. In Posner v. Travelers Ins. Co.,22 a federal district court
viewed the rule of Babcock as one of extraterritoriality, and inter-
preted it to mean that, where all parties are residents of New
York, New York law is to be applied even though the accident
takes place out of state. New York courts have not been con-
sistent in their interpretation of Babcock. The extraterritorial
concept was again apparent in Long v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc.,2 3 which interpreted Babcock to mean that a foreign restrictive
statute would not defeat a claim between New York parties,
where the site of the accident was incidental to the enterprise. Also
indicative of the confusion which exists is Macey v. Rozbicki,24
where, rather than an objective evaluation of the "contacts," an
attempt was made to determine if the situation was factually within
the scope of Babcock. The majority apparently viewed Babcock
as an exception to the lex loci rule, rather than a replacement; since
19Id. at 483, 191 N.E2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.
20 Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S2d at 750. "Where the de-
fendant's exercise of due care in the operation of his automobile is in issue,
the jurisdiction in which the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred will usually
have a predominant, if not exclusive, concern. In such a case, it is appropriate
to look to the law of the place of the tort so as to give effect to thatjurisdiction's interest in regulating conduct within its borders, and it would be
almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some other
place." Id. at 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750-51.211d. at 481, 191 N.E2d at 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
22244 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. I1. 1965).
2323 App. Div. 2d 386, 260 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st Dep't 1965).
2423 App. Div. 2d 532, 256 N.Y.S.2d 202 (4th Dep't 1965) (memorandum
decision).
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the factual situation of Rozbicki was distinguishable from that in
Babcock, the latter decision was considered not controlling.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case distinguished the
factual situation of Babcock, noting several variations. The first
significant difference was that in Dym the parties were not in transit,
but had taken up residence in Colorado, albeit on a temporary
basis. Also important was the fact that the host-guest relationship
had been formed and was to terminate in Colorado. Upon these
factors, the Court concluded that in no sense could the place of the
accident be termed "fortuitous." 25
The majority further stated that such significant "contacts,"
combined with Colorado's concern with the fate of all motorists on
its highways, warranted the application of Colorado's law and public
policy. 26 However, to dispel any possible implication that the
place where the relationship was formed was of paramount im-
portance in determining which law was applicable, the Court stressed
that this factor was only to be taken in conjunction with the general
intention of the parties, inferred from their actions; for example,
in Dym, the parties had "accepted the benefit of that [Colorado's]
law for . . . a prolonged period." 27 The Court refused to
consider the facts that the automobile was registered and insured
in New York as having independent significance, since they were
mere incidents of domicile.28  Thus, New York's contact was
reduced to that of the domicile of the parties. Thereupon, this
single factor was summarily rejected since a rule of lex domicilii
would be just as inflexible and contrary to the spirit and rationale
of Babcock as was the lez loci principle. 29
Pursuing a course of argument reminiscent of Kilberg, the
plaintiff suggested that New York's "governmental interest" (public
policy) would prohibit the imposition of the restrictive Colorado
statute, since it would be New York's duty to care for her if she
were to become destitute. The Court dismissed this contention,
because its major defect was that it ignored the possibility of the
defendant becoming destitute if a judgment rendered against him
were to exceed his insurance coverage. Furthermore, the Court
considered it well settled that public policy plays no part in choice
of law problems, and is not by itself to be considered a contact.3
2 5 Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 124-25, 209 N.E2d 792, 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d
463, 466-67 (1965).
26 Id. at 125, 128, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 797, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467, 470.
27 Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467. The Court dis-
tinguished Babcock on this ground, since "in Babcock the New Yorkers at
all times were in transitu . . . " Ibid.
28 Id. at 126, 209 N.E2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468. But see Comments
On Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict Of Laws, 63
CoLu m. L. REv. 1212, 1246 (1963) (Ehrenzweig's view, emphasizing the
significance of the state where the automobile was insured).29 Supra note 25, at 127, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69.
so Id. at 127-28, 209 N.E2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
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The Court acknowledged that lex loci delictus will no longer
be invariably applied,31 and indicated as one reason for its disfavor
the extensive mobility of the American people, made possible by
modem transportation facilities. As the multi-state contacts of
the people increase, the frequency of unjust results, in cases involving
competing state interests, becomes correspondingly greater.3 2
The Court discussed the conflicting treatments in New York
and Colorado of the ramifications of the host-guest relationship. New
York's policy is simply the application of the usual negligence
precept of ordinary care, while Colorado has chosen to deviate
from this standard where this relationship was involved. The
purpose of the Colorado guest statute was the protection of the
right of injured parties, other than the negligent driver's guest,
to the defendant's assets. To prevent collusive actions, the public
policy of the state foreclosed an action by a passenger against
the driver.
33
It is interesting to note that, from a decision which purported
to be "no departure from the rule announced in Babcock, merely
an example of its application," Chief Judge Desmond, who concurred
in Babcock, and Judge Fuld, the author of both Auten and Babcock,
dissented. Moreover, Judges Van Voorhis and Scileppi, who
dissented in Babcock, concurred in the majority opinion of Dym.
Judge Van Voorhis' dissent in Babcock criticized the decision
as standing for the application of New York laws and policy,
without regard to the interests of other states, whenever New York
parties were concerned:
Attempts to make the law or public policy of New York State prevail
over the laws and policies of other States where citizens of New York
State are concerned are simply a form of exmtraterritoriality which can
be turned against us wherever actions are brought in the courts of New
York which involve citizens of other States.34
The conclusion that Babcock enunciated an absolute rule, i.e., that
New York law is to apply whenever New York parties are the
litigants, does not appear to be one validly drawn from that
decision. In fact, the Dyrn decision, by refusing to apply New York
law, demonstrates that no absolute standard is to be formulated;
3
" This is not to indicate that the law of the place of the injury is never to
be applied, but rather, that it will be applied only when that state surpasses
all others in the significance of its contacts and interests. Id. at 123, 209
N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S2d at 465-66.32 d. at 127-28, 209 N.E.2d at 796, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 469.
a3 Two other policies were responsible for Colorado's guest statute: the
protection of Colorado drivers and insurers against fraudulent claims, and
the prevention of suits by ungrateful guests. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794,.
262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
34 Babcock v. Jackson. supra note 18, at 486, 191 N.E.2d at 286, 240 N.Y.S_
2d at 753 (dissenting opinion).
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rather, the determination of each case will be made on the basis
of the specific contacts evident in the individual factual situation.
Judge Fuld, dissenting in Dym, considered that the balance of
the "contacts" involved justified the application of New York law;
he particularly noted the fact that New York was the parties' domicile
and the place to which they returned after the accident.35
In Auten, which introduced the "grouping of contacts" theory
into New York law, his decision was greatly influenced by the fact
that England was the place where the wife and children resided
and he concluded that it had the greatest concern in securing to the
wife and children essential support and maintenance.
36
In addition, judge Fuld attempted to establish a "public policy"
contact in Dym on the premise that plaintiff could become a public
charge of the state of New York.87  Aside from the majority's
answer to this argument, the fact that plaintiff eventually returned
to New York does not seem to possess any independent significance
as a contact since it is no more than an incident of domicile. It is,
after all, expected that a domiciliary will return to his domicile.3
The position taken by Chief judge Desmond in his dissent
is that the rule stated and applied in Babcock is simply that New
York's policy allowing recovery by a guest against a negligent host
applies whenever both parties are New York domiciliaries, regard-
less of the fact that the relationship between the parties arose in a
foreign jurisdiction.3 9  The Chief Judge's view should not be
surprising, since it was clearly indicated by his opinion in Kilberg.
Recognizing, in that case, the anomalous results often obtained
under lex loci, the measure and even the right of recovery depending
upon the varying laws of the different states, he indicated that
New York "courts should if possible provide protection for our own
State's people against unfair and anachronistic treatment of lawsuits
which result from these disasters." 40 His decision in Kilberg was
based on New York's public policy, as was his concurrence in
Babcock.41 He feels that in tort cases, where New York parties
are litigating in a New York court, the law to be applied, as to
liability and compensation, is that of New York since, in such
3 Dymn v. Gordon, supra note 25, at 129-30, 209 N.E.2d at 797, 262 N.Y.S.
2d at 471 (dissenting opinion).36 Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 162, 124 N.E.2d 99, 103 (1954).
87Dym v. Gordon, supra note 25, at 132-33, 209 N.E.2d at 799, 262 N.Y.S2d
at 473 (dissenting opinion).
38 STUMBORG, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 26-27 (3d ed. 1963).
39 Dym v. Gordon, spra note 25, at 134, 209 N.E.2d at 800-01, 262 N.Y.S2d
at 474-75 (dissenting opinion).
40 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 17, at 39, 172 N.E2d
at 527-28, 211 N.Y.S.2d at 135.
41 Dym v. Gordon, supra note 25, at 135, 209 N.E2d at 801, 262 N.Y.S.2d
at 475 (dissenting opinion).
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circumstances, no other state can have an interest in the enforcement
of its own particular public policies.
42
The desire for the enunciation of a firm rule which can be
easily followed by lower courts and attorneys is at the heart of
Chief Judge Desmond's aversion toward the "grouping of contacts"
approach. He maintains that the processes of counting "contacts"
or weighing respective "interests" can never satisfactorily decide
an actual lawsuit.43
Concededly, these processes could lead to conflicting decisions by
different lower courts of a jurisdiction and result in an increase
in the number of appeals taken. However, as Babcock is further
refined, new guideposts will lessen the likelihood of inconsistency."4
Even at the present time, the lack of predictability with respect
to unintentional torts, is not a major problem. The primary im-
portance of predictability lies in assisting the attorney in the nego-
tiation of settlements.
45
It is in the context of the different interpretations of Babcock
v. Jackson that the significance of Dym v. Gordon is found. Dym
clearly indicates that Babcock's importance as a precedent is not
for the decision reached upon its particular facts, but for the
establishment of the "grouping of contacts" approach in the torts
area. In fact, Dym used the approach to limit the Babcock decision
by refusing to apply New York law where the place of injury
was also the site of the establishment of the host-guest relationship
and the temporary residence of the parties.
In applying the Babcock approach, the Court is careful to note
that no one "contact" is to be considered controlling. This is
essential to a just and reasonable result in each particular situation.
There is no reason why one invariable standard should be substituted
for another or why the new one would not be subject to the
same criticism as the original. The Babcock approach, in its
present state of refinement, would certainly necessitate an ad hoc
determination of almost every choice of law problem. This is not,
however, as alarming as it may at first appear. These decisions
42 bid.
43Ibid.
- Comments On Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development It Conflict
Of Laws, 63 CoLum. L. Rm,. 1212, 1254 (1963) (Reese's view). The situation
is quite different in commercial law where predictability is a factor of great
importance. The United States Supreme Court in Texas v. New Jersey,
a case concerning the escheating of personal property, rejected the significant
contacts rule proposed on the basis that it would leave the area in permanent
turmoil. 379 U.S. 674, 678 (1965). It is to be noted that when presented
with a case in the torts area, the Court saw no reason to deny the imple-
mentation of the "grouping of contacts" theory. Richards v. United States,
369 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1961). New York has also refused to extend the theory
in commercial law. See Matter of Bauer, 14 N.Y2d 272, 200 N.E.2d 207,
251 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1964).
45Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, -, 133 N.W.2a 408, 411 (1965).
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demand interpretation and construction, processes which are basic
to the very nature of the jurist.
Dym v. Gordon is a "guidepost" case, the first of many whose
clarifications are essential to the precise utilization of the approach
outlined in Babcock. Although, as such, its significance is limited,
it performs well-in providing a direction to be followed and new
impetus for the principle.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-POSTAL RESTRICTION OF COMMUNIST
PROPAGANDA Dzmm) INVALm.-The addressees of unsealed mail,
containing "communist political propaganda," originating in a
foreign country, attacked the constitutionality of a federal statute 1
which authorized detention of such mail upon its arrival in the
United States, until a written request for its delivery was made.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the statute
was violative of the first amendment, since its requirement of a
written request to obtain the mail constituted a restriction on the
unfettered exercise of the addressee right to free speech. Lamont
v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
The freedoms of speech and press, at the time they were
embodied in the Constitution, consisted primarily of immunity from
prior restraints, i.e., censorship.2  Prevention of censorship, how-
ever, was not their exclusive purpose. Any action on the part of the
Government which might prevent free discussion of public matters
was also prohibited,3 thus the unconditional phrasing of the first
amendment: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .
Nevertheless, the first amendment does not protect every utter-
ance; the right to speak is not absolute.4 The right to express
one's views freely, however, has come to enjoy a preferred status.5
1 Postal Serv. and Fed. Employees Salary Act, 39 U.S.C. §4008(a)
(1964).2 Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MicH. L. Ray.
703, 714 (1938). See generally CHAFEE, FRmom oF SPEEcH (1920).
32 CooLEY, CONsTITUTIONAL LImITATIoNs 886 (8th ed. 1927); Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245 (1936).
4 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 708 (1931). For example, the follow-
ing types of speech are not protected by the first amendment: obscenity, Roth
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) ; "group libel," Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250 (1952) ; advocacy of the violent overthrow of the government,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). But see the dissenting opinions
of Mr. Justice Black in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961);
Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 415 (1961).
5 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). But see the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77, 89 (1949).
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